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'Covert Action' is back in the news as President Reagan and the 
Congress square off on the question of resuming military aid to the 
Nicaraguan rebel forces. Together with the recent flight into exile of 
Haitian despot "Baby Doc" Duvalier and American attempts to persuade 
Philippine strongman Ferdinand Marcos to step down, this calls to mind 
an earlier era when covert action played a larger, but less visible role in 
American foreign policy. Stephen Rabe examines covert American efforts 
in 1960-61 to remove from power another despot: Rafael Trujillo, dictator 
of the Dominican Republic. Rabe concludes that although the U.S. 
government, through the CIA, aided the dissidents who ultimately 
assassinated Trujillo, it is not at all certain that either President 
Eisenhower or President Kennedy intended that he should be overthrown 
in that manner. 
If there is a lesson in this it is probably that there are limits on the 
ability of a superpower to control discreetly the actions of its 'proxies', and 
that their actions may have unintended consequences. This message is 
implicit in Efraim Karsh's study of the Soviet experience in using arms 
supplies to influence the actions of its allies in the Middle East. Karsh sees 
the arms/ influence relationship in these cases as one of negative returns for 
the Soviet Union. The Soviet clients persisted in pursuing their own 
national interests, which were invariably at odds with Soviet interests, in 
spite of Soviet exercise of its power as the principal supplier of the clients, 
weapons. 
In some circumstances, however, the exercise of superpower influence 
may be more hazardous for the client. Timothy Lomperis argues that 
insurgencies, such as that in Vietnam in the 1960s, are essentially crises of 
'legitimacy' for the incumbent government. The latter's struggle to retain 
legitimacy in the eyes of its own people may be undermined by foreign 
intervention on behalf of the regime. Such intervention may, in any case, 
rebound on the foreign power itself, undercutting the legitimacy of its 
intervention policy among its domestic political constituency. Lomperis' 
conclusions council caution and political sensitivity in the formulation of 
policy to deal with these complex forms of low-intensity conflict. 
The "Achille Lauro" incident notwithstanding, concern about the 
legitimacy of possible American actions appears to have guided U.S. 
policy for countering terrorism in the direction of caution. In spite of 
enormous pressures to 'do something' about international terrorism, the 
Reagan administration has shown remarkable restraint. It clearly 
recognizes that public support for a policy involving the use of force can 
evaporate overnight if force is mishandled or unsuccessful. As this 
interception of the "Achille Lauro" pirates demonstrated in dramatic 
fashion, the key to successful action using minimum force is accurate 
intelligence. Richard Crabtree takes this as a starting point for his 
assertion that legislative constraints on domestic intelligence-gathering 
restrict dangerously the ability of law enforcement authorities to deal with 
terrorism. In the event that foreign terrorists bring their wars to American 
streets, something Libya threatens to do, Crabtree believes that American 
security forces may be hampered severely in their ability to respond. He 
acknowledges, however, that there is an inherent conflict between a 
democracy's right to protect its citizens and institutions and its duty to 
preserve the liberties and rights of those individual citizens. Legitimacy 
thus cuts both ways; it may be undermined by over zealous attention to 
security or to civil liberties. 
On behalf of the Staff and the Editorial Advisory Board, I am pleased 
to welcome Professor Richard E. Morgan to the Board of Conflict 
Quarterly. A graduate of Columbia University and former Fellow at the 
Harvard Law School, he is Professor of Constitutional Law and 
Government at Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine. An established 
scholar of the American political and legal system, Professor Morgan 
devoted considerable efforts to the study of the American intelligence 
community. His major work in this field, Domestic Intelligence: 
Monitoring Dissent in America, was published by University of Texas 
Press in 1980. 
